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Abstract 
This paper has been carried out to empirically examine the relationship between auditor’s tenure, audit firm size and 
auditor’s independence. A cross-sectional survey research design was used for the purpose of this paper with a 
sample size of fifty (50) audit firms in Edo and Lagos States in Nigeria. The statistical technique used for this paper 
was the binary logistic regression. From our findings, auditor’s tenure (TEN) does not compromise the independence 
of the auditors and audit firm size (AUD) does not also compromise the independence of the auditor. It was therefore 
recommended that to ensure that the independence of an auditor is not compromised, the length of audit tenure 
should not exceed 5years . 
Keywords: Audit tenure, audit firm size and auditor’s independence. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Auditor’s independence is seen as the back bone of the auditor’s profession. It is an important part of the 
statutory financial reporting process and a necessary condition for adding value to all audited financial report. 
Izedonmi (2000) opines that independence is of the mind, characterized by objectivity and integrity on the part of the 
auditor. Auditor’s independence is an important ingredient in audit practice. De Angelo (1981) and Simunic (1984) 
posit that there is an understanding that auditors face substantial economic cost when there is an occurrence of audit 
failure but in contrast Becker, Defond, Jiambalio and Subramayan (1998). DeFond, Raghumandan and 
Subramanyam, (2002) say that independence could be influenced because auditors are reluctant to bring up issues 
pertaining to the preparations of the financial statement at the risk of losing lucrative fees from its clients.  Becker et 
al (1998) and DeFond et al (2002) also say that independence could be influenced because auditors are reluctant to 
bring up issues pertaining to the preparations of the financial statement at the risk of losing lucrative fees from its 
clients, thereby making the subject theoretically ambiguous. 
Previous studies, empirical evidences have shown that the auditors’ tenure, audit firm size, size of the audit 
fee, client size and the audit committee to mention but a few are factors that pose as a threat to auditors’ 
independence. Works by Simunic (1984), have carefully explained that when a firm is wealthy and has gained 
significant recognition in the society like the Big 4 (i.e, Akintola Williams Deliotte, KPMG, Ernst & Young and 
Price Water House (PWC)), it is relatively impossible for such audit firms to be economically dependent on its client. 
They tend to do their work carefully and are motivated to carry out proper examination of their clients report. Even 
Shockley (1982), McKinley, Pany and Reckers (1985) are also in agreement. 
Consequently, this paper addresses this research question with the aim of contributing to knowledge and 
ascertaining how auditors’ tenure and the audit firm size pose as a threat to the auditors’ independence. The 
remaining part of this paper is divided into four sections. Section two (2) provides a review of prior research 
examining the relationship between the auditor’s independence, auditors’ tenure and audit firm size. Section three (3) 
shows our methodological approach and results presentation. The results are discussed  in section four (4) and 
summary and concluding remarks are presented in section five (5). 
 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Several variables which could have impact on the independence of auditors have been identified in prior 
research works, for instance Sucher and Maclullich, (2004), says an auditor’s independence can be influenced by 
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conscious inaccuracies or by unconscious inaccuracies in reported information, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and 
DeFond, Raghunandan, Subramanyam (2002), has revealed that the fees paid by clients to auditors as incentives to 
compromise their independence had an economic significance. DeAngelo, (1981) identified audit fee as a possible 
threat, including Hensen & Watts, (1997) and Reynolds & Francis, (2001) who also identified non-audit fees as one 
too. This is just to mention a few, but in a bid to investigate those factors that have an impact on the independence of 
an auditor, this paper would focus on variables such as audits’ tenure (TEN) and audit firm size (AUD).  To 
investigate their impact on auditor’s independence, this paper focuses on the variable audit firm size (AUD). 
Literature reviews on each of these variables are as specified below. 
2.1 AUDITOR’S TENURE  
The prolonged association between an audit firm and company-client could lead to the closeness of the 
auditing firm with its company-client’s management which in turn makes it difficult for the auditor to freely express 
his professional opinion (Larvin, 1976 & 1977). Previous works done by Barkess and Simnett,(1994); De Ruyter & 
Wetzels (as cited in Bamber & Iyer, 2007); Defond et al. (2002); Geiger and Ragunandan,(2002); Carcello and 
Nagy,(2004), have shown that lengthy audit firm tenure leads to a reduced propensity of issuing a qualified audit 
report. Complacency, lack of innovation, less rigorous audit procedures, and a learned confidence may arise after 
long association with the company-client (Shockley, 1982). Professional accounting bodies like AICPA (1978 and 
1992), ICAA and CPA Australia (2001) and Coordinating Group on Audit and Accountant Issues (2003) also 
expressed concerns that the length of audit client relationship may impair audit quality which in turn affects the 
auditors’ independence. 
 
 In contrast to the above, the works of Ye, Carson & Simnet (2006), they tried to contribute to the debate on 
auditor independence by providing evidence as regards the relationship between non-audit services and audit firm 
tenure, audit partner tenure and alumni affiliation. Their findings showed that the prohibition of lengthy audit firm 
tenure may not be necessary. They disagree with recent findings of other corporate researchers that a long auditor-
client relationship can have a possible negative effect on the independence of an auditor. 
 
H1: Audit tenure is significantly associated with auditor’s independence 
 
2.2 AUDIT FIRM SIZE  
In other to safeguard their reputation, large audit firms ensure independent audit services.  There are 
different firms which vary in sizes; therefore, it’s only normal to believe that the larger the size of an audit firm, the 
more the client pays as audit fees. Titard (1971), Hartley and Ross (1972), Shockley (1981), McKinley, Pany and 
Reckers (1985) and Palmrose (1988) all share the same view that when it comes to smaller companies, larger firms 
are less dependent on them because the associated fees in most cases makeup a smaller portion of the audit firms 
total revenue. But when it comes to smaller firms, they have a more personal and close relationship with their clients. 
Most of these large audit firms are able to undertake large company audits effectively, with the aid of research 
facilities, superior technologies and better experienced employees (Lys and Watts, 1994). Pearson (1980) discovered 
that auditor’s independence is positively associated with size of audit firm, because they have difficulty in resisting 
client pressure. The larger client firms have more to lose if an unfavourable judgment is made in a lawsuit.  
Furthermore, Feltham, Hughes and Simunic (1991), Dye (1993), Clarkson and Simunic, (1994) posit that 
firms that are wealthy are not dependent on their client companies. They are therefore more motivated to carry out 
proper examinations of client companies and are able to avoid being sued for wrong reports and in cases of audit 
failure they can shoulder their responsibilities. 
H2: Audit firm size is significantly associated with auditor’s independence. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The method of data analysis used was the regression analysis. A cross-sectional survey research design was 
used and Binary Logistic regression technique was adopted in this paper due to its cherished properties of 
unbiasedness, efficiency and consistency. Binary Logistic regression is a technique for making predictions when the 
dependent variable is a dichotomy, and the independent variables are continuous or discrete. 
 
The source of data used was obtained mainly from primary sources. They were obtained through the 
distribution of questionnaires to the staff of audit firms in Edo and Lagos States. The sample procedure adopted was 
random sampling method. The audit firms were used as our unit of analysis. The primary method of data collection 
used was the questionnaire method. The questionnaire enables the respondents give more truthful responses as a 
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result of its anonymous nature. The questionnaire was constructed in two parts the first part is concerned with the 
biostatistics of the respondents while the second part consisted of fifteen questions which covered the issues that 
relate to the topic. 
 
The paper empirically examined Auditors’ tenure, audit firm size and auditors’ independence. In order to 
determine the relationship among the variables, a model was specified. 
 
The model in its functional form was specified as follows: 
 AI = f (AUD, TEN)     
The model in its econometric form is presented below: 
AI = B0 + B1AUD + B2TEN +Ut     
Where: 
AI = Auditors Independence 
AUD = Audit firm Size 
TEN = Auditors’ Tenure 
U = Error term 
 B1, B2 > 0 
 B0 …….. B2 = Coefficient 
 
Table 1: OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND EXPECTATED SIGNS 
 
VARIABLES EXPLANATION DEFINITION APRIORI SIGNS 
AI Auditors Independence Audit fee divided by total fee 
(where total fee is made up of 
fees from audit and non-audit 
services) or Audit fee divided 
by turnover. 
Dependent variable 
AUD Audit Firm Size If it’s any of the Big 4 
{Akintola Williams Delloitte; 
KPMG; Ernst & Young and 
Price Water House (PWC)} 
audit firms, it’s (1), if not (0). 
Positive (+) 
TEN Auditor’s Tenure The length of time an auditor 
was engaged in a firm. 
Positive (+) 
Source: Researchers compilation (2012) 
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Following our model specification, it can be deduced that Audit firm Size (AUD) and Auditors’ Tenure 
(TEN) are potential factors that can influence Auditors Independence (AI) in Nigeria. In analyzing the collected data 
we adopted descriptive statistic as shown on the table below: 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables  
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Jarque-Bera (P-Value) 
AUD 
TEN 
AI 
3.9 
2.79 
0.82 
1.22 
1.62 
0.38 
22.53(0.00) 
17.27(0.00) 
80.11(0.00) 
Source: E-views Output (2012) 
 
The table 2 above gives the description of variables used in estimation. The average response scores for Audit 
firm Size (AUD), Auditors’ Tenure (TEN) and Auditor’s Independence (AI) are 3.9, 2.79 and 0.82 while their 
standard deviation values are 1.22, 1.62 and 0.38 respectively. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test values of all the variables 
shows that they are normally distributed since all their p-values are significant at 1% level. 
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3.2 Discussion of Probit Regression Results 
The table below shows Binary probit regression results: 
Table 3:  Probit Regression Result 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.439014 0.816627 -1.762144 0.0780 
AUD 0.163173 0.198214 0.823217 0.4104 
TEN 0.181883 0.173689 1.047182 0.2950 
     
     McFadden R-squared 0.166694     Mean dependent var 0.822785 
S.D. dependent var 0.383065     S.E. of regression 0.358827 
Akaike info criterion 0.829181     Sum squared resid 19.82851 
Schwarz criterion 0.906715     Log likelihood -61.50530 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.860669     Deviance 123.0106 
Restr. Deviance 147.6176     Restr. log likelihood -73.80881 
LR statistic 24.60701     Avg. log likelihood -0.389274 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000019    
     
     Obs with Dep=0 28      Total obs 158 
Obs with Dep=1 130    
     
     Source: E-views Output (2012) 
3.3 Regression Equation 
AI = -1.43 + 0.16AUD + 0.18TEN  
        (-1.762)   (0.823)       (1.047) 
NOTE: The Z-values are reported in parentheses below each of the co-efficient estimates. 
The table 3 above shows the Binary probit regression results of the independent variables (audit firm size 
and auditor’s tenure) and auditor’s independence as the dependent variable. 
A close examination of the Pseudo (R2) which is also called the McFadden's (R2) which serves as an analog 
to the squared contingency coefficient, with an interpretation like R-square.  The Pseudo R2 with a value of 0.17 
indicates that Audit firm Size (AUD) and Auditors’ Tenure (TEN) can explain only about 17% of the total 
systematic variation of audit independence in Nigeria. This implies that about 83% of the total systematic variation 
in the dependent variable has been left unaccounted for by the model hence captured by the stochastic error term. 
This implies that other factors not included in the model accounts for audit independence in Nigeria. On the basis of 
the overall statistical significance of the model, it was observed that the LR ratio statistics value of 24.6 is significant 
at 5% level of significance.   
 The Z-statistic is an alternative test which is commonly used to test the significance of individual probit 
regression coefficients for each independent variable.  The probit regression result shows that AUD and TEN with a 
calculated Z-value of 0.82 and 1.04 respectively are less than 1.96 at 5% level of significance. Thus the audit firm 
size and the tenure of an auditor has no significant influence on the independence of auditors in Nigeria. 
4. Discussion of Results: 
Audit firm size has been found to be positive but not significantly associated with auditor’s independence. 
This goes to show that audit firm size has no significant influence on auditors’ independence in Nigeria.  This could 
be that certain characteristics inherent in one audit firm practiced in Nigeria may increase the danger of impairment 
of independence, with the tendency of a more personalized mode of service and close relationship with the client. 
The larger the audit firm size the more independent the audit is. An increase in the size of audit firm by 1unit would 
lead to about 0.16 increase in auditors independence although audit firm size has no significant influence on auditors’ 
independence in Nigeria. This findings is consistent with Feltham, Hughes and Simunic (1991), Dye (1993), 
Clarkson and Simunic,(1994). 
Auditors’ tenure has a positive relationship but it’s not significantly association with auditors’ independence 
in Nigeria. This agrees with the findings of Ye, Carson & Simnet (2006). Their findings showed that preventing a 
prolonged audit firm tenure may not be necessary because it may not have a negative effect on the independence of 
an auditor even though we know that the attachments between directors and auditors is as a result of a continued 
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business relationship. They found that trust and pleasant business partnerships increase the commitment of clients to 
the relationship and their intention to continue it. The attachments between directors and auditors have the choice of 
continuing business relationships depends on the trust that emerges between organisations due to repeated personal 
attachments and ties. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main objective of this paper was to examine the relationship between audit firm size, auditor’s tenure 
and auditor’s independence in Nigeria. To address the issue, relevant data where collected and analyzed and from 
these analyses results were therefore obtained and discussed. From the outcome of our findings, TEN and AUD are 
not statistically significant in determining auditors’ independence in Nigeria. This could be that certain 
characteristics inherent in l audit practices in Nigeria may increase the danger of impairment of independence; the 
tendency is towards a more personalized mode of service and close relationship with the client. We conclude that 
both audit firm size and auditors’ tenure are positive but not significantly associated with auditors’ independence. 
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